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Abstract
The topic of the present work is to study the relationship between the power of the learning
algorithms on the one hand, and the expressive power of the logical language which is used
to represent the problems to be learned on the other hand. The central question is whether
enriching the language results in more learning power. In order to make the question relevant
and nontrivial, it is required that both texts (sequences of data) and hypotheses (guesses) be
translatable from the “rich” language into the “poor” one. The issue is considered for several
logical languages suitable to describe structures whose domain is the set of natural numbers. It
is shown that enriching the language does not give any advantage for those languages which
de2ne a monadic second-order language being decidable in the following sense: there is a 2xed
interpretation in the structure of natural numbers such that the set of sentences of this extended
language true in that structure is decidable. But enriching the original language even by only one
constant gives an advantage if this language contains a binary function symbol (which will be
interpreted as addition). Furthermore, it is shown that behaviourally correct learning has exactly
the same power as learning in the limit for those languages which de2ne a monadic second-order
language with the property given above, but has more power in case of languages containing a
binary function symbol. Adding the natural requirement that the set of all structures to be learned
is recursively enumerable, it is shown that it pays o6 to enrich the language of arithmetics for
both 2nite learning and learning in the limit, but it does not pay o6 to enrich the language for
behaviourally correct learning.
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1. Introduction
The overall goal of the present work is to investigate in a logical framework the
power of identifying structures from an enumeration of their atomic diagram. That is,
given set L of predicate symbols, function symbols and constants, the learner receives
as input an in2nite sequence of atomic sentences true in the underlying L-structure to
be learned and outputs hypotheses in the form of 2rst-order L-sentences. Actually, to
each possible L-structure will be associated a unique set of natural numbers. So the
present learning-scenario is a combination of two di6erent paradigms:
• Inductive inference [3,8] provides mainly the abstract framework: a learner receives
a stream of data describing a set and has to come up eventually with a description of
the right set. The data-stream is in many situations equivalent (up to a computable
translation) to an in2nite enumeration of all the elements making up the set, that is
a text for the set.
• The logical paradigm [7,11,12,14] o6ers a richer representation: sets are replaced
by structures and members of the set by atomic sentences. A datum is an atomic
sentence true in the underlying structure. A hypothesis is a sentence which describes
a structure, in a way explained below. Moreover, it is assumed that the class of
structures to be learned is axiomatized by a 2rst-order sentence. Note that there
is also some connection with Inductive Logic Programming [17,21] although the
present work is on a much more abstract and theoretical level.
So the general model of the present work is the following. Let L be the underlying
logical language. The domain of all structures under consideration is the set of natural
numbers. L contains a unary predicate whose intended interpretation in a given struc-
ture is the set of natural numbers associated to it. Then the learner receives—as in the
work of Shinohara [23]—an L-text (sequence of all atomic L-sentences true in the
underlying structure) as input data and generates a sequence of hypotheses, represented
as L-sentences, which have to converge to a description of the structure (actually, the
set associated to the structure) to be learned. Texts, hypotheses and modes of conver-
gence are now described more formally.
2. Denitions and notations
Before giving a formal description, the reader should note that standard symbols of
the natural numbers like the relation ¡, the addition +, the multiplication ∗ have al-
ways their well-known meaning. Furthermore, all models considered within the present
work are expansions of the natural numbers. A learner is only required to learn an ax-
iomatization of the predicate P representing an unknown subset of the natural numbers;
the interpretation of the other symbols are either 2xed from the context of the natural
numbers or determined (in dependence of P) by a given axiomatization  already
known to the learner.
Note that within the present work, axiomatizations are always 2nite and given as
2rst-order formulas. So they can without loss of generality be given in one formula.
Furthermore, they are not required to characterize the desired class of structures within
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the world of all structures, but only within the world of standard structures extending
the standard structure of natural numbers. So it is not necessary to specify that the
individuals range over natural numbers and also not necessary to specify the meaning
of J0; J1; : : : ; s;¡;+ and ∗ by the axiomatizations. This restriction is not only handy but
also necessary since a more general axiomatization de2ning also these notions uniquely
cannot be given by a 2rst-order formula [5, VI, Satz 2.3 and Satz 4.6]. Furthermore, an
L-axiomatization might use those of these symbols which are contained in the current
language L.
2.1. Objects to be learned
Let L be a 2rst-order language with equality in which each integer n can be repre-
sented by a closed term, the numeral Jn (this can be done either with in2nitely many
constants, or with just one constant and a unary function symbol). Assume also that
L contains a unary predicate P. Given n∈N and L-structure S, denote by JnS the
interpretation of Jn in S. An L-structure S is called standard if the domain of S is
equal to { JnS | n∈N} and for all distinct m; n∈N, JmS and JnS are distinct. Intuitively,
N is the domain of the standard L-structures and for all n∈N, Jn is the name of n in
these structures.
The objects to be learned are standard L-structures. They are required to make up
a class CL which is axiomatized by a 2rst-order L-sentence . In other words, CL
is the class of all objects to be learned and it is the class of all standard L-structures
that are models of . Moreover, it is assumed that for every subset X of N, there is
at most one member S of CL such that X ={n∈N: P Jn is true in S}. Let C denote
the set of all subsets of N for which there exists some member S of CL with the
previous property. Now there exists a natural bijection between CL and C, thanks to
which one can identify each member of CL with a unique member of C. Identifying
structures with sets of integers in the just described way provides a connection between
this framework and formal learning theory. Note that in learning theory, sets are often
recursively enumerable and denoted as “languages”.
The results in this paper deal either with an arbitrary L or with speci2c choices of
L. A description of these speci2c choices of L is given below.
2.2. L-Texts
Given standard L-structure S, an L-text for S is an enumeration of all the atomic
sentences true in S. In other words, an L-text for a structure amounts to an enumera-
tion of the atomic diagram of this structure. In particular, an L-text for S contains all
sentence of form P Jn true in S. Note that texts do not contain formulas with free vari-
ables, nor sentences with quanti2ers, in contrast to the settings considered by Gasarch
and Smith [6] and by Martin and Osherson [13].
The function symbols and the constants ofL occur in anyL-text. But those symbols
which are given a standard interpretation by the axiomatization  of CL can clearly be
ignored. For instance, if L contains the binary function symbol + and + is interpreted
as addition over the natural numbers in all members of C, then a sentence like 2+3=5
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occurs in all L-texts, but is useless. On the other hand, it might be very important
to 2nd out eventually the value of constants and functions whose interpretation is not
2xed by . For instance, if c is such a constant, then an equality of the form c= Jn,
for some n∈N, must eventually come up in an L-text.
2.3. L-Hypotheses
An L-hypothesis is just a 2rst-order L-sentence. Despite of the fact that the quan-
ti2ers of a 2rst-order sentence run over individuals and not over sets, it turns out that
second-order logic, which accepts quanti2ers over unary predicate variables, plays a
major role in the proofs. Let S be a member of C. An L-hypothesis  is correct
with respect to S if it meets the following three requirements:
Satisfying the axiomatization: Any standard L-structure satisfying  must be a
model of , the axiomatization of the class C of (standard) L-structures to be learned.
Consistency: S must be a model of .
Imposing membership: For every standard L-structure T, if T is a model of 
then the inclusion {n∈N |S |=P Jn}⊆{n∈N |T |=P Jn} holds.
Note that by the 2rst requirement, any structure T that satis2es the condition stated
in the third requirement is a member of C. Note also that if  is any sentence that
satis2es the last two requirements, then ∧ satis2es all three of them.
Due to the three requirements, every standard model of  is a model of all sentences
P Jn, n∈N, that are true in S. Also,  is consistent with {P Jn |S |=P Jn}∪{¬P Jn |S |=
P Jn}. But given n∈N with S |=P Jn,  does not necessarily imply ¬P Jn. This un-
symmetrical situation is intended: the data already have this unsymmetric character
since they give explicit evidence on membership of the subset of N associated to
S, while nonmembership is only implicitly given by nonoccurrence. Furthermore,
the most common hypothesis space for learning sets in inductive inference has the
same properties: it consists of grammars which generate the elements of the set (or
language) to be learned but which—in general—do not give information on
nonmembers.
2.4. L-Learners
As in most areas of inductive inference, an L-learner M is a computable (that is
recursive) procedure which outputs, in face of any strict initial segment of an input
L-text, either an L-hypothesis or, where “?” is a special symbol that can be used to
signal that not enough data have been seen to produce a reasonable hypothesis or that
the computation time has been too short to evaluate the data. But M has to be total
in the sense that it always outputs either a hypothesis or the symbol “?”. A learner
M without this computability requirement is called a general learner. It is sometimes
useful to investigate the relation between general learners and computable learners;
furthermore, it is sometimes interesting to quantify the amount of nonrecursiveness of
a general learner or procedure. For example, such a general procedure is a-recursive
if it is computable relative to an oracle of Turing degree a or below.
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2.5. Criteria of convergence
The present work considers three basic types of learners, distinguished by the mode
of convergence to the correct hypothesis. Fix S∈C and consider the in2nite sequence
of L-hypotheses and ? issued by an L-learner in response to the sequence of all 2nite,
increasing initial segments of an L-text for S. Finite learners have to eventually output
exactly one L-hypothesis, which has to be correct with respect to S and which cannot
be replaced by an other hypothesis later. Thus when they output their hypothesis they
know that either the hypothesis is correct or the data not from a structure inside the
class to be learned. Explanatory learners have to identify S in the limit, that is after
some perhaps false hypotheses they stabilize on a last correct L-hypothesis which
they output co2nitely often. At last, behaviourally correct learners have to output only
2nitely often a wrong L-hypothesis or ? but can freely switch from a hypothesis which
is correct with respect to S to another one with the same property. A learner is said
to learn C if it exhibits the expected behaviour for all S∈C and for all L-texts
for S.
The following example illustrates the previous de2nitions. Let C be the class of all
structures over the language S such that P Jn implies Pn+ 4.
An axiomatization  for C is given by the formula (∀x) [Px⇒Pssss(x)], as + is
not part of the language, adding 4 is expressed by applying the operator s four times.
Structures in C are for example those associated to the sets of even number and odd
numbers, respectively.
If S is the structure given by the set of odd numbers, then the formula =P J1∧P J3
is consistent with Ssince 1 and 3 are odd numbers. But the other two requirements are
not satis2ed: For example the structure of the set {1; 3; 5} fails to satisfy the condition
that P Jn implies Pn+ 4. But combining ∧ to a new hypothesis creates a hypothesis
satisfying all three requirements: Every model of ∧ is of course also a model of
 and so the 2rst requirement is met. As S satis2es  and is furthermore a model
of , the structure is also a model of ∧.  imposes that P J1 and P J3 hold and 
imposes that P4n+ 1 and P4n+ 3 hold for all natural numbers n, thus ∧ implies
P Jm for all odd natural numbers m.
An L-learner for the class C starts with the hypothesis 0= and updates n to
n+1=n∧P Jm whenever a new formula P Jm occurs in the input such that no formula
P Jk with m=k + 4h has appeared in the input before. It is easy to see that such an
update happens only 2nitely often and that the last hypothesis satis2es all requirements.
So C is explanatorily learnable. C is not 2nitely learnable since the empty set is in C
and one can construct a C-text such that the learner 2rst thinks that this text belongs
to the empty set and after outputting a hypothesis the learner later 2nds out that the
real structure behind the data is the set of N. A mind change becomes unavoidable
and so the learner cannot be 2nite.
The main scenario consists in comparing the learning power of learners with the ex-
pressive power of various logical languages. It is clear that a richer language normally
allows larger hypotheses spaces and so is very likely to increase the power of learning.
Therefore, the present work focuses on the more interesting situation where L is en-
riched in a restricted way. Roughly speaking, the question is whether it is possible to
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Fig. 1. From L-texts to L-hypotheses.
learn some class of standard L-structures by translating the L-texts for the members
of C, emulating an H-learner and retranslating the hypotheses, when at the same time
no computable L-learner is able to learn C (see Fig. 1). More formally, the question
is whether, given CL satisfying some L-axiomatization and given extension H of L,
one can 2nd a class CH of standard H-structures such that the following holds:
(a) Each member of CL is the L-restriction of a unique member of CH, and each
member of CH has a unique L-restriction in CL.
(b) CH has an H-axiomatization.
(c) L-texts can be completed to H-texts.
(d) H-hypotheses can be translated into L-hypotheses.
(e) Some computable H-learner learns CH.
(f) No computable L-learner learns CL.
So one wants to know whether there exist classes CL, CH satisfying the six condi-
tions above, or whether for all classes CL, CH, if the 2rst 2ve conditions are satis2ed
then the last one is violated. That is, in the 2rst case it pays o6 to enrich L whereas
in the second case it does not pay o6 to enrich L. The requirements should get some
more explanation. In particular, formal de2nitions have to be provided for the notions
mentioned in (c) and (d).
(a) Recall that a class of subsets of N, denoted C, is in natural bijection with CL.
This clause clearly implies that C can also be put in natural bijection with CH, that
is each member S of CH can be identi2ed with the unique member of C consisting
of all n∈N such that P Jn is true in S. But H can provide additional information in
the form of predicates, functions or constants over the domain N of the structures in
consideration.
From now on, it is assumed that H always denotes an extension of L and that any
mention of CH presupposes that (a) holds.
(b) In view of the previous condition, axiomatizing CH clearly means enriching the
formalization of CL to capture the possible interpretations of the symbols in H\L.
From now on, it is assumed that any mention of CH presupposes that (b) holds. In
the same way any mention of CL presupposes that CL has an L-axiomatization.
(c) A completion reads 2nite sequences of atomic L-sentences and adds to them
atomic H-sentences in such a way that the following requirement is met: whenever
T is an L-text for an L-structure S in CL, then the completion is an H-text for
the member of CH whose L-restriction is S. More precisely, a completion of L-
texts to H-texts is a function whose domain is the set of 2nite sequences of atomic
L-sentences, whose image is the set of 2nite sequences of atomic H-sentences, such
that F()⊆F() whenever ⊆ , and such that for every ⊂-chain (i)i∈lN of 2nite
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sequences of atomic L-sentences, if
⋃
i∈lN i is an L-text for S∈CL then
⋃
i∈lN F(i)
is an H-text for the unique member of CH whose L-restriction is S.
For the ease of notation, only L-sentences (respect. H-sentences) not true in all
members of CL (respect. CH) will be represented in an L-text (respect. H-text) for
a member of CL (respect. CH). For example, if H contains a constant c whose
interpretation varies in CH, then the completion of any L-text for a member of CL
has to produce eventually an equation of the form c= Jn. Similarly, if H contains a
unary function symbol f whose interpretation varies in CH, then the completion of
any L-text for a member of CL has to produce eventually for every n∈N an equation
of the form f( Jn)= Jm.
From now on, it is assumed that any mention of CH presupposes that (c) holds.
But in some propositions complexity requirements on the completion will be
imposed.
(d) A translation ofH-hypotheses into L-hypotheses is a function G whose domain
is the set of H-sentences, whose image is the set of L-sentences, such that for every
H-hypothesis  that is correct for S∈CH; G() is a L-hypothesis that is correct
for the L-restriction of S.
Note that an H-hypothesis might contain some symbols from H\L and the trans-
lation must then 2nd a way to replace them. Also note that (e) implicitly postulates
that for every member S of CH, there exists an H-hypothesis which is correct with
respect to S. Hence if (e) holds, (d) implies that for every member S of CL, there
exists an L-hypothesis which is correct with respect to S. Note that this still holds
if “computable” is substituted by “general” in (e).
From now on, it is assumed that any mention of CH presupposes that (d) holds.
But in some propositions complexity requirements on the translation will be imposed.
(e) Whereas no a priori computability constraints are placed on conditions (c) and
(d), it is highly desirable that learners are computable. Sometimes it is interesting to
ask whether a 2nite H-learner can be turned into an explanatory L-learner; but most
results compare H-learners with such L-learners where both have to satisfy the same
criterion of convergence.
(f) One says that enriching the logical language L to H pays o6 if no computable
L-learner learns CL, but some computable learner learns CH. Otherwise, that is, if
CL is learned by a computable L-learner, enriching the logical language L to H
does not pay o6.
Within the present work, various languages are used as the basic logical language
L, and the interpretations of all their symbols except P will be 2xed and correspond
to one of the usual operations on the natural numbers. On the other hand, the extended
language H will contain symbols whose interpretations will not be 2xed. The main
logical languages L considered in this paper are the union of {P} with one of the
following, whose symbols all have an intended interpretation.
B This is the basic language containing for each natural number n the constant Jn,
naturally interpreted by n. Within this language it is impossible to de2ne subsets
of N which are both in2nite and coin2nite. Thus the class C of subsets of N
associated via P to the members of CL can consist of 2nite and co2nite sets
only.
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S This language consists of the basic language B plus the unary function symbol s
which is interpreted as successor (sx=x + J1).
O This language consists of the basic language B plus the binary predicate symbol
¡ which is interpreted as the natural strict total order on the natural numbers.
Note that s is omitted since it can be de2ned by y=sx ⇔ x ¡ y∧(∀z) [z ¡
x∨ z=x∨ z=y∨ z ¿ y].
P This language consists of the basic language B plus the binary function symbol +
which is interpreted as addition on the natural numbers. Note that ¡ is omitted
since it can be de2ned by y ¡ x ⇔ (∃z)[y=x + z + J1 ].
A This language is the standard language of arithmetics which contains binary func-
tion symbols + and ∗ interpreted, respectively, by addition and multiplication on
the natural numbers. A frequently used property of this language is the Theorem
of Matiyasevich stating that every recursively enumerable set is Diophantine and
thus can be de2ned by an existential sentence in this language. If one omits any
restriction on the quanti2ers, one gets the arithmetic hierarchy which consists ex-
actly of those sets which can be computed relative to some iterated Turing jump
of the empty set.
The next section will give some abstract properties which show when enriching a
language L does not pay o6. Further information on inductive inference, inference in
logic and recursion theory in general is given in the books [9,14,18]. One important
concept from recursion theory is the notion of a Turing degree [18] which is a mea-
sure for the complexity and degree of nonrecursiveness of a general algorithm: Such
algorithm may consult an oracle and two oracles have the same Turing degree i6 one
can compute each of them using the other one as an oracle. Important Turing degrees
are these of the Halting problem, called 0′, and the one of the problem whether two
programs compute the same function, called 0′′.
3. General languages
This section gives some basic overviews on the topic. Recall that conditions
(a)–(d) are assumed to be true. It is shown that the additional condition (e) implies
the existence of a successful general learner and that the interesting question is the
existence of a successful computable learner.
Proposition 1. Suppose that some explanatory (respect. :nite, behaviourally correct)
H-learner learns CH. Then some general explanatory (respect. :nite, behaviourally
correct) L-learner learns CL.
Proof. Clearly, the general L-learner N only has to complete a given L-text to anH-
text, simulate the H-learner M on longer and longer initial segments of that H-text,
and output only L-hypotheses that translate the H-hypotheses output by M . Hence N
will make at most as many mind changes as M . In particular, whenever M is a 2nite
learner, so is N .
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It is easy to see that the learner N in the proof of previous proposition becomes
computable if both the completion of L-texts into H-texts and the translation of H-
hypotheses into L-hypotheses are computable. So there is no need to enrich L intoH
if one can both complete L-texts e6ectively and translate H-hypotheses e6ectively.
Remark 2. If the completion of L-texts to H-texts and the translation of H-hypo-
theses into L-hypotheses are computable, then the L-learner in Proposition 1 can be
chosen to be computable.
It is well-known that 2nite learners of Turing degree 0′ can be simulated by com-
putable learners converging in the limit. Such a simulation can also cope with a 0′-
recursive process to translate H-sentences into L-sentences. So one gets the following
corollary.
Corollary 3. Suppose that the following conditions are satis:ed:
(a) L-texts can be 0′-recursively completed to H-texts.
(b) H-hypotheses can be 0′-recursively translated into L-hypotheses.
(c) Some 0′-recursive :nite H-learner learns C.
Then some computable explanatory L-learner learns C.
4. When enriching the language does not pay o$
If X is equal to B, S or O, then the set of monadic second-order X-sentences
true in the standard structure of the natural numbers is decidable [4,24]. Recall that
monadic second-order logic is the extension of 2rst-order logic which accepts unary
predicate variables and quanti2cation over these variables. Although BOuchi [4] showed
it only for S, the result also holds for O [24] since the relation ¡ is de2nable by a
monadic second-order S-sentence: x¡y if and only if there is an initial segment H
of the natural numbers which contains x but which does not contain y:
x ¡ y ⇔ (∃H) [x ∈ H ∧ y =∈ H ∧ (∀z) [sz ∈ H ⇒ z ∈ H ]]:
As a consequence of these decidability results, it does not pay o6 to enrich any of
B∪{P}, S∪{P} or O∪{P}. The three languages can be dealt with simultaneously.
Indeed, the following arguments work for any set X of predicate and function sym-
bols with a 2xed interpretation over N such that the set of monadic second-order
X-sentences true in the standard structure of the natural numbers is decidable.
Note that enumerations of nonempty subsets of N can be e6ectively converted into
L-texts for any L such that all symbols in L\{P} have a 2xed interpretation over N.
So for those L, one could simply work on texts as they are de2ned in the numerical
paradigm: the characterization of learnability of classes of sets within the numerical
paradigm yields a corresponding characterization in the logical paradigm. This remark
justi2es the following consideration. Recall that C is the class of all subsets of N
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associated with each member of CL. Then C is learnable (in the numerical paradigm)
i6 the following conditions hold [9, Theorem 3.26].
• In the case of 2nite learning: For every nonempty set C in C, there is a 2nite subset
D of C such that for all C′ in C, if D⊆C′ then C′=C.
• In the case of learning in the limit: For every nonempty set C in C, there is a 2nite
subset D of C such that for all C′ in C, if D⊆C′ then C′ ⊂C.
Note that these conditions are for a general learner and so the e6ectiveness condition
of Angluin [1] is left out in the second condition. The basic idea is now to use these
characterizations to turn a given nonrecursive learner into a computable one.
The below results need the following notion: Given sentence  and unary predicate
variable H , [H=P] stands for the result of substituting all occurrences of P in  by
H (if  does not contain P then [H=P] is ).
Theorem 4. Suppose that all symbols in L\{P} have a :xed interpretation over N
and that the set of monadic second-order (L\{P})-sentences true in N is decidable.
If some general :nite L-learner learns CL, then some computable :nite L-learner
learns CL.
Proof. Clearly, it can be assumed without loss of generality that each member of
C is non-empty. Recall that some L-sentence  axiomatizes CL. As quoted above,
since a general 2nite L-learner learns CL, each member C of C has a 2nite subset
D={n0 : : : ni} which is not contained in any member of C distinct from C, which
means that
(D): (∀L; H)[(D ⊆ L) ∧ (D ⊆ H) ∧ [L=P] ∧ [H=P]⇒ (L = H)]
is true, where D⊆X (for X =L; H) is an abbreviation for Xn0∧ : : :∧Xni and L=H is
an abbreviation for (∀x) [Lx↔Hx].
Consider the procedure de2ned as follows. Let D={n0; : : : ; ni} be the set of all
integers n such that P Jn occurs in the input data. Output “?” if (D) does not hold
and
Pn0 ∧ Pn1 ∧ : : : ∧ Pni ∧ 
otherwise. This procedure is computable by assumption and clearly de2nes a com-
putable 2nite learner who learns CL.
A corresponding theorem holds also for the case of learning in the limit.
Theorem 5. Suppose that all symbols in L\{P} have a :xed interpretation over N
and that the set of monadic second-order (L\{P})-sentences true in N is decidable.
If some general explanatory L-learner learns CL, then some computable explanatory
L-learner learns CL.
Proof. As in the previous proof, it is assumed without loss of generality that C does
not contain the empty set, and  denotes an L-sentence which axiomatizes CL. Let
(j)j∈ lN enumerate all L-sentences. As quoted above, since a general explanatory L-
learner learns CL, every member C of C has a 2nite subset D such that no member
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of C distinct from C both contains D and is strictly included in C, which means that
if D={n0; : : : ; ni}, then
{n0; : : : ; ni} ⊆ L ∧ [L=P] ∧ (∀H)[({n0; : : : ; ni} ⊆ H ∧ [H=P])⇒ H ⊂ L]
is consistent just in case L is interpreted by C. Moreover, note that there exists j∈N
such that j[L=P]∧(∀H) [j[H=P]⇒L⊆H ] is true when L is interpreted by C, as
follows from the existence of a correct L-hypothesis with respect to S (since a
general L-learner learns C). Now set:
"D;j(L) = (D ⊆ L) ∧ [L=P]
∧ (∀H)[(D ⊆ H) ∧ [H=P]⇒ H ⊂ L]
∧ j[L=P]
and consider the procedure de2ned as follows. Let 2nite sequence  of input data be
given, and let D={n0 : : : ni} be the set of all integers n such that P Jn occurs in .
Output “?” if there is no j at most equal to the length of  such that (∃L) ["D;j(L)]
is true. Otherwise, output ∧j, where j is least such that (∃L) ["D;j(L)] is true. This
procedure is computable by assumption, and clearly de2nes a computable explanatory
learner who learns C.
Applying Proposition 1 to the previous results, one obtains that it does not pay o6
to enrich the languages B, S and O.
Corollary 6. Suppose that some explanatory (respect. :nite) H-learner learns CH.
Then some computable explanatory (respect. :nite) L-learner learns CL.
Merkle [16] has pointed out to the authors that it follows from some results of BOuchi
[4] that in the case of a countable class C axiomatizable by an O-sentence, all members
C of C are periodic, that is, satisfy the formula
(∃x)(∀y ¿ x)[P(y + Jn) = Py]
for some constant n. Since y + Jn can be formulated by n times using the successor
symbol and since the values Py of all y6x+ Jn can be 2xed by a table, one can compute
a formula which has C as its only solution. This fact could be used to simplify the
proof of Theorem 5 in the case that one chooses L equal to either S∪{P} or O∪{P}.
In the resulting test condition "D; j(L) one could replace “(∀H) [j[H=P]⇒L⊆H ]” by
“(∀H) [j[H=P]⇒ (L=H)]”. A similar simpli2cation of the proof is also possible for
the language B.
5. The arithmetic language A
The decidability of the set of monadic second-order (L\{P})-sentences true in N
indicates that L has a poor expressive power. In particular, the (natural) requirement
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that C be the class of standard models of an L-sentence turns out to be a very strong
constraint for such an L. So what happens for richer choices of L? In this section, the
issue is addressed for L=A∪{P}=B∪{+; ∗}∪ {P}. A is very powerful since it
enables to de2ne all arithmetic sets. In particular, it is rich enough to represent every
recursively enumerable set, even to represent every family of uniformly recursively
enumerable sets. Thanks to the richness of A, A∪{P} can be enriched for the bene2t
of learning! The next theorem contrasts with the previous one since it implies that it
pays o6 to enrich rich languages, whereas it does not pay o6 to enrich poor languages.
Theorem 7. Suppose that L=A∪{P} and H=A∪{P}∪ {c}, where c is a con-
stant that does not belong to A. Then one can choose CL and CH in such a way
that the following holds:
(a) L-texts can be 0′′-recursively completed to H-texts.
(b) H-hypotheses can be computably translated into L-hypotheses.
(c) Some computable :nite H-learner learns CH.
(d) No computable explanatory L-learner learns CL.
Proof. Let (We)e∈ lN denote an acceptable enumeration of all recursively enumerable
sets. For all e∈N set Ve={1; 2e}∪{2x+3 : x∈We}, and let C consist of every in2nite
set Ve and every 2nite set Ve\{u}, where u is an odd member of Ve. It is easy to verify
C is a uniformly recursively enumerable class. Fix a uniformly recursive enumeration
(Ud)d∈ lN of C. Recall that all symbols in A\{P} are standardly interpreted in all the
models under consideration. So CL is fully determined by C. To de2ne CH, let C∈C
be given, and let S denote the H-structure in CH which should associate to C. If
C is in2nite, then the interpretation of c in S is taken to be the interpretation of J0
in S. If C is 2nite, then there exists unique e; u∈N such that C=Ve\{u}, and the
interpretation of c in S is taken to be the interpretation of Ju in S. Before it is shown
that CL and CH satisfy the claim of the theorem, the implicit assumptions that CL
and CH have an L-axiomatization and an H-axiomatization, respectively, have to be
checked.
By the theorem of Matiyasevich [15, p. 69] there is an A-formula
)′(x; y; y1; y2; : : : ; y9);
such that for all d∈N:
x ∈ Ud ⇔ (∃y1; y2; : : : ; y9)[)′(x; Jd; y1; y2; : : : ; y9)]:
Denote by )(y) the L-formula
(∀x) [Px ⇔ (∃y1; y2; : : : ; y9) [)′(x; y; y1; y2; : : : ; y9)]]
and denote by  an A-axiomatization of addition and multiplication on the natural
numbers. Clearly,  ∧(∃y) [)(y)] is an L-axiomatization of CL. Using the theorem of
Matiyasevich again, it is possible to de2ne the relation x∈Ve by an A-formula, and
it is easy to verify that the relation |Ud|=∞ can also be de2ned by an A-formula.
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Hence there exists an H-formula ’(y) such that for all d∈N, the interpretation of
’( Jd) is
(|Ud| =∞⇒ c = J0) ∧ [|Ud|¡∞⇒ (∃e)[(2e ∈ Ud) ∧ (c ∈ Ve\Ud)]]:
Clearly,  ∧(∃y) [)(y)∧’(y)] is an H-axiomatization of CH.
(a) Let d; e; u∈N be such that either Ve is in2nite and Ud=Ve, or Ve is 2nite and
Ud=Ve\{u}. Let T be an L-text for the L-structure associated to Ud. Then P2e occurs
in T , and a 0′′-oracle determines whether Ve is in2nite or 2nite. If Ve is in2nite, then
c= J0 holds in the H-structure associated to Ud. If Ve is 2nite, a 0′-oracle determines
Ve. Furthermore, one 2nds the |Ve| − 1 members n of Ud by waiting for the n such
that P Jn occurs in T . So one element n∈Ve remains for which P Jn does not occur in T .
One knows that this n satis2es c= Jn in the H-structure associated to Ud. It follows
immediately that L-texts can be 0′′-recursively completed to H-texts.
(b) Recall the de2nitions of ’(y) given above. Let L-structure S in CL and
H-structure T in CH be associated to the same member of C. Let  be an H-
hypothesis correct with respect to T. It is then easy to verify that
 ∧ (∃y; z)[(∀x)[Px ⇔ x ∈ Uy] ∧[z=c] ∧ ’(y)[z=c]]
de2nes an L-hypothesis which is correct with respect to S. It follows immediately
that H-hypotheses can be computably translated into L-hypotheses.
(c) There exists a computable H-learner O who waits until statements of form P2e
and c= Jn have appeared in the input; these statements de2ne a unique member S of
CH, and O can output an H-hypothesis which is correct with respect to S.
(d) Assume for a contradiction that some computable explanatory L-learner M
learns CL. Since the interpretation of all symbols in A is 2xed and computable, one
can work with texts in the numerical paradigm instead of L-texts. Given d∈N, denote
by f(d) the integer e such that either Ve is in2nite and Ud=Ve, or Ve is 2nite and
Ud=Ve\{u} for some u∈N. Given e∈N denote by V ∗e the set of 2nite sequences of
members of Ve. Say that ∈V ∗e is a locking sequence for M and Ve just in case:
(∀ ∈ V ∗e )[M () = M ()]:
Since M is an explanatory learner who learns CL, for all d∈N, if Wf(d) is in2nite
then there exists a locking sequence for M and Vf(d). Moreover, the functions of  and
d “ is a locking sequence for M and Vf(d)” and “Vf(d)=range()” are 0′-recursive.
Since for all d∈N, one can 2nd a  such that at least one of the conditions is satis2ed,
there exists a 0′-recursive function F producing such a  on input d. Without loss of
generality it can be assumed that 2f(d) occurs in F(d) for all d∈N. If Vf(d) is in2nite
then |Vf(d)|¿|range(F(d))| + 1 and if Vf(d) is 2nite and F(d) is a locking sequence
for M and Vf(d), then |Vf(d)|6|range(F(f(d)))| + 1 since F(f(d)) must contain all
elements of the set Vf(d)\{2f(d)} but one for knowing which one was not enumerated
into Ud. Furthermore if Vf(d)=range() then |Vf(d)|6|range(F(d))| + 1 trivially. It
follows that
|range(F(d))|+ 1 ¡ |Vf(d)| ⇔ |Vf(d)| =∞⇔ |Wf(d)| =∞:
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Since 2f(d) occurs in F(d), F is 0′-recursive, and the test whether r6|Vf(d)|
is 0′-recursive for every number r, the index-set {e∈N |We is in2nite} would be
0′-recursive, a contradiction. Such a computable learner M cannot exist.
By Corollary 3, it is impossible to place a 0′-recursive completion into the condition
(a). This can only be done if one changes one of the requirements (c) and (d). So in
Corollary 8 both requirements deal with learning in the limit while in Corollary 9 both
requirements deal with 2nite learning.
Corollary 8. Suppose that L=A∪{P} andH=A∪{P}∪ {f}, where f is a unary
function symbol that does not belong to A. Then one can choose CL and CH in such
a way that the following holds:
(a) L-texts can be 0′-recursively completed to H-texts.
(b) H-hypotheses can be computably translated into L-hypotheses.
(c) Some computable explanatory H-learner learns CH.
(d) No computable explanatory L-learner learns CL.
Proof. The main change is to replace the constant c by a unary function f which
approximates the value of the constant c in the limit.
This brings down the complexity of the completion from 0′′ to 0′. Formally, f is
de2ned such that f(x)=0 whenever |Ve|¿x and f(x) takes the unique value in the
di6erence Ve − Ud if |Ve|6x. Each value f(x) can—after suQcient long waiting—be
derived from the data seen so far while using an oracle in or above the Turing degree
0′ of the Halting Problem.
On the other hand 2nite learning is weakened to learning in the limit. But that
learning in the limit is still possible, can be seen as follows: at each stage x the H-
learner N of Corollary 8 outputs what the originalH-learner from Theorem 7 O would
output if c would be known to have the value f(x). Since f converges to the value
of c, the behaviour of N and O in the limit is the same.
Corollary 9. Suppose that L=A∪{P} and H=A∪{P}∪ {c}, where c is a con-
stant that does not belong to A. Then one can choose CL and CHin such a way that
the following holds:
(a) L-texts can be 0′-recursively completed to H-texts.
(b) H-hypotheses can be computably translated into L-hypotheses.
(c) Some computable :nite H-learner learns CH.
(d) No computable :nite L-learner learns CL.
Proof. In case one wants to weaken (d) to postulate that no 2nite L-learner identi2es
CL but keep the other requirements unchanged, one has to code the halting problem
instead of the in2niteness problem. One can take a subfamily (Wg(e))e∈ lN selected by
a one-to-one computable function g such that Wg(e) is 2nite i6 e∈K ; furthermore the
cardinality of Wg(e) is the time until e is found in K in the case that Wg(e) is 2nite.
Similarly one works with (Vg(e))e∈ lN instead of (Ve)e∈ lN and rede2nes (Ue)e∈ lN such
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that only the Ve in the range of g are considered. Parts (b) and (c) of the proof of
Theorem 7 transfer directly.
For part (a), this can now be done by waiting until 2g(e) shows up in the text,
2nding the corresponding e, computing the size of Wg(e) which is now a 0′-recursive
task and then waiting until all elements of Vg(e) but one have shown up in the case
that Vg(e) is 2nite, that is, that e∈K . Then one knows that c= J0 in the case e =∈ K and
c is the still missing value of Vg(e) in the case that e∈K .
For part (d), assume by way of contradiction that M is a computable 2nite
L-learner. Now one shows that e =∈K i6 there is a ∈V ∗g(e) such that M () = ? and
WM () contains at least 2 elements in Vg(e) − range(). This must happen if Vg(e) is
in2nite and Ud=Vg(e) but it must not happen if Vg(e) is 2nite since M has to see all
elements of Vg(e) but one before being able to identify Ud which can be any subset of
Vg(e) with |Vg(e) − Ud|=1. So one gets that {e∈N | |Ve|=∞} and thus {e∈N | e =∈K}
are recursively enumerable, a contradiction to K not being recursive. Therefore such a
2nite learner M cannot exist.
6. Presburger arithmetics
Since Presburger [19] showed that 2rst-order arithmetic with addition but without
multiplication is decidable, one might assume that a result parallel to those for B, S
and O also holds for the language P. But the presence of the predicate P destructs
this decidability-result and allows to code nonrecursive information into the class to be
learned. Therefore, extending the language will permit an increase of learning power,
for 2nite learning as well as for learning in the limit. The main result is based on the
fact that the set of all square numbers is de2nable in P by the following formula:
Q J0 ∧ Q J1 ∧ (∀x; y)[Qx ∧ Q(x + y + J1) ∧ (∀z ¡ y)[¬Q(x + z + J1)]
→Q(x + y + y + J4) ∧ (∀z ¡ y + J2)[¬Q(x + y + z + J2)]]
Intuitively, the formula says that 0 and 1 are squares and whenever x and x + y + 1
are neighbouring squares, then x + y + y + 4 is the next square.
So one can now de2ne the multiplication using Q [20]: a number z is the product
of x and y if x2 + y2 + z + z=(x + y)2, thus it is suQcient to de2ne the square of x.
But y=x2 i6 y and y + x + x + 1 are squares and there is no square between y and
y+ x+ x+1, a property which can be tested using the predicate Q. That is, a formula
de2ning the multiplication is the following:
x ∗ y = z⇔ (∃u; v; w)[z + z + u+ v = w
∧ Qu ∧ Q(u+ x + x + J1) ∧ (∀t ¡ x + x)[¬Q(u+ t + J1)]
∧ Qv ∧ Q(v+ y + y + J1) ∧ (∀t ¡ x + x) [¬Q(v+ t + J1)]
∧ Qw ∧ Q(w + x + x + y + y + J1) ∧ (∀t ¡ x + x)[¬Q(w + t + J1)]]:
So one can transfer the results on A to P by considering classes which contain all
sets L⊕Q where L ranges over the setsin the original class C from the corresponding
result in Section 5 and (L⊕ Q)(x + x)=L(x) and (L⊕ Q)(x + x + 1)=Q(x).
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Proposition 10. Theorem 7 and Corollaries 8 and 9 hold also with P in place of A.
The above results on increasing the learnability were obtained by choosing the ad-
ditional information appropriately which might look a bit arti2cial. Therefore it might
be interesting to ask what happens if one increases the logical language P to A. The
answer is that this does not give any improvement of learning power: the completion
of a (P∪{P})-text to an (A∪{P})-text is computable and the retranslation of the
hypotheses of the learner are required to be computable by (b) in Theorem 7 and
its corollaries; so, by Proposition 1 there is a computable (P∪{P})-learner which
completes the text, simulates the (A∪{P})-learner and retranslates the hypotheses.
7. Behaviourally correct learning
BJarzdiRnSs [2] introduced the concept of behaviourally correct learning where a learner
M identi2es an object under this concept if and only if M outputs an in2nite sequence
of guesses such that almost all of them are a valid description of the object to be
learned. The main source of the power of behaviourally correct learning is that the
learning-algorithm is not required to test the equivalence of hypotheses and so might
continuously integrate new data in the hypothesis. Therefore, it is not surprising that
in the case of languages L=X ∪ {P} such that the set of monadic second-order
X-sentences true in the standard structure of the natural numbers is decidable, be-
haviourally correct learning does not give an advantage in comparison with explanatory
learning.
Proposition 11. Suppose that all symbols in L\{P} have a :xed interpretation over
N and that the set of monadic second-order (L\{P})-sentences true in N is decidable.
If some behaviourally correct L-learner learns CL, then some explanatory L-learner
learns CL.
Proof. Let M be a behaviourally correct L-learner who learns CL. The explanatory
L-learner N simulates M . Let n∈N be such that M has made the outputs 50; 51; : : : ; 5n
so far. By the decidability assumption, N can compute the least m6n such that 5k is
equivalent to 5n for k=m;m+1; : : : ; n in the sense that 5k and 5n are valid descriptions
of the same L-structure. Formally, N checks for k=n; n−1; : : : ; 0 the monadic second-
order sentence
(∃L)(∀H)[5k [L=P] ∧ 5n[L=P] ∧ (5k [H=P]⇒ L ⊆ H) ∧ (5n[H=P]⇒ L ⊆ H)]
and if there is a minimal m such that the sentence holds for k=n; n− 1; : : : ; m then N
outputs 5m and if such an m does not exist, that is, if 5n is not the description of any
L-structure, then N outputs “?”.
It follows that whenever M converges semantically in the sense that almost all 5n in
the output represent the same L-structure then N converges syntactically to the 2rst
5m such that all 5n with n¿m represent this structure. So N is an explanatory learner
who learns CL i6 M is a behaviourally correct learner who learns CL.
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For learning relative to the language A∪{P}, behaviourally correct learning is much
more powerful than explanatory learning. There is no arithmetical Turing degree a
relative to which every behavioural correct learner can be turned into an a-recursive
(A∪{P})-learner learning the same class in the limit. Indeed, the next proposition
shows that the relation is exactly the reverse one: whenever a class is learnable in the
limit relative to some arithmetical Turing degree a then there is also a computable
behaviourally correct learner of the same learning power. Combining this with the
result of Jain and Sharma [10] that some class of recursively enumerable sets can be
learned in the limit relative to a′′ but not relative to a, one obtains that a-recursive
learner cannot cover the power of behaviourally correct learning.
Proposition 12. Suppose that L=A∪{P}. Let a be an arithmetic Turing degree
and assume that some a-recursive explanatory L-learner learns CL. Then some com-
putable behaviourally correct L-learner learns CL.
Proof. Let 50; 51; : : : ; be a computable enumeration of allL-sentences. The explanatory
L-learner M who learns CL can be described by an arithmetic formula "(v; w) such
that for all i; j∈N, if i is a numerical representation for the input seen so far, then
"(Ji; Jj) is satis2ed if and only if M outputs 5j on the input represented by i. Now
faced with the input represented by i, the behavioural correct L-learner N outputs the
formula i given as
("(Ji; J0) ∧ 50) ∨ ("(Ji; J1) ∧ 51) ∨ · · · ∨ ("(Ji; Ji) ∧ 5i):
Note that whenever M converges on an L-text T to a formula 5j, then for almost all
inputs  from T , if i∈N represents  then N outputs i, j6i and the sentence "(Ji; Jj)
holds. It follows that, almost always, the formula i is equivalent to "(Ji; Jj)∧5j and
thus equivalent to 5j. So N has at least the same learning power as M .
An immediate consequence is that behaviourally correct learning is more powerful
than explanatory learning for the logical language A∪{P}. By considering again the
joins L⊕Q of the sets L∈C with Q where Q is the set of square numbers, one can
transfer this result also to P∪{P}.
Corollary 13. Suppose that L=A∪{P} or L=P∪{P}. Then one can choose CLin
such a way that some computable behaviourally correct L-learner learns CL, but no
computable explanatory L-learner learns CL.
One might ask whether the power of behaviourally correct learning can be extended
by enriching the logical language A or P in the sense of Theorem 7. Although this
is open in the general case, one can refute this conjecture for the special case that C
consists only of recursively enumerable sets. In this case, the exact opposite holds, that
is, one cannot increase learning power by enriching the language A.
Theorem 14. Assume that L=A∪{P} and that C consists only of recursively enu-
merable sets. Suppose that some behaviourally correct H-learner learns CH. Then
some computable behaviourally correct L-learner learns CL.
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Proof. The learning algorithm makes use of the existence of some A-axiomatization
of C and of a universal formula )(w; x) such that )( Jj; Jn) holds i6 n is eventually
enumerated into the jth recursively enumerable set. This universal formula allows now
to quantify over recursively enumerable sets by quantifying over w.
By concatenating the completion of L-texts to H-texts, the H-learner and the
translation of H-hypotheses into L-hypotheses, one gets a, generally nonrecursive,
L-learner. This learner can be replaced by another L-learner, say M , built as in
Theorem 5.
Note that for the learner M only the sets inside C are relevant, therefore M ’s
algorithm is still correct when quantifying over recursively enumerable sets instead of
quantifying over all sets. The quanti2cation over recursively enumerable sets can be
implemented using a universal A-formula )(w; x) of the kind described above and
quantifying over w.
Now there is an A-formula "(w; x) with the following property. Let input  be
given and let i∈N be a numerical code representing . Then M () outputs an L-
hypothesis which is correct with respect to the L-structure associated to the recursively
enumerable set of index j, that is the set {n∈N |)( Jj; Jn) holds}, i6 "( Jj; Ji) is satis2ed.
This allows to output the following hypothesis in response to input :
(∃w)["(w; Ji) ∧ (∀x)[Px ⇔ )(w; x)]]:
The algorithm assigning this output to  clearly de2nes a behaviourally correct L-
learner who learns CL.
8. Conclusion
The main topic of the present work was to investigate how the learning power
depends on the logical language in which the data are presented and the hypotheses
are stated. In particular, for various languages L containing symbols with a 2xed
interpretation over the structure of natural numbers, it has been determined whether
enriching this language toH by adding further symbols allows more powerful learning
under the constraint that L-texts can be completed (not necessarily e6ectively) to H-
texts and that H-hypotheses can be retranslated into L-hypotheses. The classes to be
learned were required to have an L-axiomatization and an H-axiomatization.
It has been shown that for three languages whose associated monadic second-order
languages enjoy a decidability result, namely the languages B, Sand O, axiomatizing
the classes of structures to be learned is a very restrictive constraint, which make it
impossible to increase the learning power by enriching the language. On the other
hand, working on the basis of P and A it is already possible to increase learning
power signi2cantly by adding one single constant c. These extension made use of the
Vexibility obtained by de2ning the new constant as desired; if one enriches P to A,
one does not get additional learning power.
Behaviourally correct learning coincides with learning in the limit for those logi-
cal languages with a decidable monadic second-order result. But for P and A, be-
haviourally correct learning gains extra power when the language is enriched. Adding
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the natural requirement that the class of sets associated to the structures to be learned
is recursively enumerable, one can show that enriching A does not pay o6 with respect
to behaviourally correct learning although it pays o6 to enrich A with respect to 2nite
learning and learning in the limit.
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